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How would North Korea’s development of the capability to target the United States 
with nuclear weapons influence its foreign policy? I argue that it would cause more 
dangerous crises than those of the last decade, and predict that these crises would 
eventually cause Kim Jong Un and his senior military associates to experience fear 
of imminent nuclear war or conventional regime change. I show that the effect of 
such fear would depend on whether or not Kim believes that he has control over the 
occurrence of these events. I argue that if he experiences fear and believes that he has 
some control over whether these extreme events actually happen, he will moderate 
his nuclear threats and behave more like other experienced nuclear powers. But if 
he experiences fear and believes that he has no control, he will likely pursue policies 
that could cause nuclear war. I use this insight to prescribe and proscribe policies for 
Washington, Seoul and the regional community. 
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Introduction
How would the capability to target the United States with nuclear missiles 
influence North Korean foreign policy? What might the United States, South 
Korea and the regional community do to prevent the worst outcomes and 
encourage desirable ones? In this article I shall address these questions and argue 
that Kim’s personal experience of fear of imminent nuclear war in what I shall 
argue is an inevitable nuclear crisis—if Pyongyang develops the aforementioned 
capability—will largely determine whether nuclear war erupts on the Korean 
peninsula. 
While Pyongyang’s persistence with its nuclear program in defiance of 
international sanctions and its growing isolation seem designed to achieve 
a nuclear arsenal capable of targeting the U.S. mainland, it is far from clear 
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that it will be realized, and I do not address that question here (Hymans 2006; 
Solingen 2006). However, it is also unclear how such a capability would influence 
Pyongyang’s behavior. The question of how nuclear proliferation influences a 
state’s conflict propensity has received extensive theoretical (Waltz and Sagan 
2013) and empirical (Horowitz 2009; Gartzke and Jo 2009; Beardsley and Asal 
2009a; 2009b; Gartzke 2010) treatment. However, exactly how nuclear weapons 
influence the behavior of new nuclear powers remains unclear (Feaver 1995, 769; 
Karl 1997, 118; Montgomery and Sagan 2009, 321; Jervis 2009, 212). The potential 
destruction that nuclear war would involve could encourage moderation, but 
it could also cause revisionism precisely because the destruction of nuclear war 
makes war unlikely (Snyder 1965, 199). It is also possible that because North 
Korean policy is already so undesirable, nuclear weapons capable of targeting the 
United States will change little of Pyongyang’s behavior (Gartzke and Jo 2009). 
I do not extensively detail the history of the North Korean nuclear program, 
efforts by the United States, South Korea and their allies to curtail it, nor 
Pyongyang’s recent provocations. Rather, I provide a theoretical prediction of 
how North Korea would behave after developing deliverable nuclear weapons 
that is grounded in realist theory and social psychology (Jervis 1976; Khong 1992; 
Mercer 1996; Reiter 1996). I make four arguments. First, North Korea has been 
practicing nuclear compellence. Second, developing the capability to target the 
United States with nuclear missiles would likely cause more of the same behavior, 
much of which would likely be more dangerous. Third, nuclear compellence 
tends not to realize revisions to the status quo, and actually tends to cause nuclear 
crises, at least when practiced by new nuclear powers. Finally, the danger posed 
by a North Korean nuclear missile capability would depend on whether Kim 
Jong Un, and/or the other generals or military officials responsible for the use of 
nuclear weapons, experience fear of imminent nuclear war or regime change, and 
believe that they have some control over whether nuclear war actually occurs. 
By control, I do not refer to that which Kim might have over the bureaucracy, 
military or even diplomacy, but rather the simple belief that he can or cannot 
control whether nuclear war occurs amidst a nuclear crisis. By nuclear crisis, I 
refer in this context to a crisis more dangerous than those which have already 
occurred on the Korean peninsula. I shall argue that if the North Korean leaders 
experience fear of imminent nuclear war or regime change, and believe that 
they have some control over whether these events occur, they would refrain from 
nuclear compellence and behave more like other experienced nuclear powers. 
Even so, however, Pyongyang will be unlikely to give up its nuclear weapons and 
may continue to provide sensitive nuclear assistance to other parties (Kroenig 
2010; Fuhrmann 2012). On the other hand, if the leaders experience fear of 
imminent nuclear or conventional war and believe that they have no control over 
whether it occurs, they may use nuclear weapons in a last bid either to save the 
regime or to inflict some damage on Seoul and the United States. I conclude 
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with implications of this analysis for policy prescriptions and proscriptions for 
the United States, South Korea and the regional community to realize a peaceful 
Korean peninsula. 
Importantly, because I am predicting the behavior of North Korea after Kim 
achieves a qualitatively distinct technological breakthrough that he has not yet 
realized, past North Korean behavior tells us little about future behavior when 
Pyongyang can target the United States with nuclear missiles. The ability to 
target one’s primary adversary with nuclear weapons is revolutionary, especially 
if one has a survivable second strike arsenal. So, North Korean behavior before 
achieving this milestone should be different from its behavior after having 
done so (Jervis 1989; Waltz 1990). Because North Korea has yet to achieve this 
breakthrough, and evidence on the beliefs of North Korean leaders is elusive, 
I support my claims through a combination of case studies and quantitative 
evidence from other nuclear power cases and, in the case of fear, from 
experimental studies with randomly selected Americans. Those who believe that 
we can learn nothing about North Korea from the experiences of new nuclear 
powers in the Cold War, China, and South Asia will find little of interest here. I 
submit that while North Korea is obviously unique in many important ways, we 
can learn a lot about how Pyongyang would behave when it can target the United 
States with nuclear weapons from a careful reading of the historical record.
Nuclear Compellence Rarely Works 
Thomas Schelling (1966) long ago differentiated between deterrence and 
compellence. Deterrence involves threats to respond, usually with retaliation, 
to challenges to the status quo. Compellence involves threats to respond with 
retaliation to the continuation of the status quo: the threat is directed to an 
actor to stop some action that he has already begun or to initiate an action that 
he has thus far refrained from doing (Schelling 1966; Byman and Waxman 
2002). When both states have nuclear weapons, compellence tends to be harder 
than deterrence (Jervis 1989, 28-32). Nuclear weapons make conflict costly; so 
insofar as challenges tend to increase the probability of war, nuclear weapons 
reinforce the status quo. While deterrence is aimed at maintaining the status 
quo, compellence aims to revise it. Deterrent threats force one’s adversary to 
make the first move amidst uncertainty that the defender will retaliate and that 
this retaliation could cause undesired escalation. Compellent threats require 
the compeller to move first and risk nuclear escalation because the adversary 
defies the threat by inaction. Because moving first and challenging the status 
quo is dangerous, nuclear deterrence is usually easier than nuclear compellence. 
Finally, because both sides have lived with the status quo for a while, threats to do 
something that might cause nuclear war if it is maintained are less credible than 
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threats to move closer to nuclear escalation if it is revised. Pyongyang has lived 
with an unfavorable status quo for 60 years. One might argue that the end of the 
Cold War presents new challenges because sources of Soviet and Chinese support 
have dried up; but the Cold War ended 15 years ago. North Korean threats to 
revise an intolerable status quo under the threat of potential nuclear escalation 
lack credibility because of the simple fact that Pyongyang has lived with the post-
Cold War status quo for 15 years and the general status quo for 60 years.   
Quantitative and qualitative evidence supports the claim that nuclear 
compellence tends not to cause revisions to the status quo. Sechser and 
Fuhrmann (2013) analyzed a series of compellence threats from 1918 to 2001 
and found that nuclear compellence threats cause desired revisions in about 20% 
of cases, a figure that is less than the success rate of conventional compellence 
threats. McGeorge Bundy (1988) offered a more detailed qualitative assessment 
of nuclear compellence in the Cold War and found little evidence that it revises 
the status quo. Nuclear weapons did not allow Mao Zedong to revise territorial 
boundaries with the Soviet Union in the disputed Ussuri River region in the late 
1960s. Pakistani nuclear weapons have not allowed a revision of the Kashmir 
division on Pakistani terms; and Indian nuclear weapons have not stopped 
terrorists based in Pakistan from occasionally attacking India. 
For over a decade, North Korea has used nuclear and missile tests to 
unsuccessfully compel the United States to formally end the 1950-53 Korean 
war, grant it diplomatic recognition and end its political and economic isolation. 
Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons have reinforced deterrence against aggression 
directed at North Korea and the subversion of Kim’s regime. But Pyongyang has 
been practicing nuclear compellence rather than, or at least as well as, nuclear 
deterrence, in two senses. While deterring threats to the regime appears at first 
to be deterrence, it can also be viewed as compellence because the status quo is 
moving against North Korea. Over time Pyongyang’s economy will grow even 
weaker relative to South Korea’s, leaving Seoul with the potential to develop vastly 
stronger conventional military power. As global information flows become faster 
and more interconnected, Pyongyang has to ensure that North Koreans prefer 
the little they have over the riches that they will inevitably see elsewhere. These 
trends will not decrease over time. Economic migrants working in China, legally 
or illegally, return to the North with news from the outside. Radio broadcasts 
by Voice of America and Radio Free Asia can be picked up in North Korea 
near the Chinese border and perhaps throughout the country. South Korean 
movies, videos, and music, the possession of which can be severely punished, 
are constantly brought and smuggled into North Korea. South Korean non-
government organizations often float balloons into North Korea with packages 
of Chinese food, currency and newspapers. Threats to respond to undesirable 
behavior with a “sea of fire” are about not only deterring aggression against 
Pyongyang but also restraining the global forces that promise to eventually 
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undermine North Korea. Pyongyang’s strategy of seeking negotiated resolutions 
with the United States on its own terms through calculated brinksmanship—
a strategy very similar to Khrushchev’s Soviet Union—is fundamentally about 
revising the status quo and a clear case of nuclear compellence. North Korea has 
been practicing nuclear compellence for over a decade, but it has not realized 
Pyongyang’s revisionist goals.
As of December 2011, North Korea may have amassed enough enriched 
uranium for between four and seven nuclear weapons, and enough plutonium for 
about 12 weapons (Albright and Walrond 2012). Pyongyang’s recent challenges 
have been especially dangerous. The March 2010 sinking of the South Korean 
corvette Cheonan killed 46 South Korean seamen, and the December 2010 firing 
of 180 artillery shells on the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong killed two South 
Korean marines, two local construction workers, injured 19 and destroyed dozens 
of properties. These two strikes have constituted the most serious conventional 
military attack by North Korea on South Korea since an attempted commando 
raid on the South Korean presidential palace in 1968. Perhaps more tellingly, 
Victor Cha found that every North Korean provocation for the past 30 years has 
been followed within about six months by a period of dialogue and negotiations 
where Pyongyang has gained some concession (Cha 2008, 237). The October 
2006 first nuclear test led to international condemnation and United Nations 
Security Council sanctions but also prolonged negotiations with the United 
States. When Pyongyang launched its three-stage Taepodong-I ICBM in 1998 
over Japan, the Clinton administration hosted missile talks with the North in 
New York within two months. Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un have surely learned 
that nuclear compellence will realize negotiations with the United States. Nuclear 
weapons have destabilized the Korean peninsula because Kim and his associates 
have likely learned that North Korean nuclear missiles able to target the United 
States might allow further threats and uses of force to generate sustained revisions 
to the status quo.
The historical record suggests that Kim will keep practicing nuclear 
compellence until he experiences fear of imminent nuclear war. I have argued 
at greater length elsewhere that when nuclear powers desire revisions to the 
status quo and issue a series of nuclear compellence threats to achieve them, 
the experience of fear of imminent nuclear war is necessary to moderate their 
revisionism (Cohen 2013). Nikita Khrushchev, who was largely responsible for 
Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War crisis years of 1958-1962, issued three 
separate threats to remove the U.S. and allied presence in West Berlin and revise 
the German status quo (Fursenko and Naftali 1996; 2007; Taubman 2003). He 
persisted with the strategy after its failure to achieve U.S. concessions in 1959 
and 1961. He refrained from issuing further challenges after deploying nuclear 
missiles to Cuba and the Cuban Missile Crisis. One might argue that the Cuban 
Missile Crisis was about defensive goals in Cuba while the Berlin crises were 
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about revisionist goals in Berlin, but much evidence shows that Khrushchev 
also had revisionist Berlin objectives in mind when he authorized such a large 
offshore missile base in Cuba. However, Khrushchev refrained from challenging 
the status quo after experiencing fear of imminent nuclear war. A systematic 
search of Soviet archival material and the primary and secondary literature on 
Khrushchev and the Cold War crises revealed no evidence that he experienced 
fear of imminent nuclear war earlier than October 24, 1962 (Cohen 2013). 
Mao Zedong challenged Soviet troops on Zhenbao Island in the Ussuri 
River in the years after developing nuclear weapons in 1964. The last skirmish 
occurred in 1969, just before the war scare when Mao was so worried about a 
Soviet strike that he ordered his entire government and army to retreat from 
Beijing for the countryside (Kuisong 2000). Pakistan has long aimed to revise the 
status quo in Kashmir: the 1948, 1965 and 1999 wars were all fought in large part 
over this region. Although the role of the Pakistani government in the October 
2001 attacks on the Indian parliament and the May 2002 attacks on Indian 
civilians at the Jammu military base remains unclear, it seems certain that then 
President Musharraf experienced fear of imminent nuclear war on May 30 and 
31, 2002 (Cohen 2013). Pakistani nuclear threats have largely ceased since then, 
and violence in Kashmir has substantially declined, although not disappeared. 
Musharraf and Mao do not appear to have experienced fear of imminent nuclear 
war before 1969 and 2002 respectively. Pyongyang has persisted with nuclear 
compellence policies that have caused several crises that do not seem to have 
caused Kim Jong Il or Kim Jong Un to experience fear of imminent nuclear war. 
There are strong reasons to suspect that Kim Jong Un will continue to pursue his 
nuclear compellence policy of calculated brinksmanship until he experiences fear 
of imminent nuclear war.
If six to ten nuclear warheads—that may not be able to be mated with 
medium and long range missiles—have caused the North Korean brinksmanship 
of the last decade, the ability to target the United States with nuclear weapons 
would likely cause at least more of the same, and perhaps even more dangerous, 
behavior. Kim Jong Un and his senior army generals likely believe that their 
existing small arsenal has increased their chances of revising their undesirable 
status quo. The current capability was sufficient for Kim, having tested a long 
range missile and conducted North Korea’s third nuclear test, to threaten to 
attack South Korea and U.S. military bases in Japan and Guam, to withdraw from 
all non-aggression pacts with South Korea, place two North Korean Musudan 
missiles on high alert and shut down the Kaesong Industrial complex, one of 
the last remaining vestiges of cooperation with Seoul. Kim Jong Il periodically 
engaged in similar behavior. If North Korea’s current force was sufficient to 
embolden Kim to engage in this behavior, the development of the capability to 
reliably target the United States with nuclear weapons should cause either more 
of the same or perhaps even more dangerous behavior.
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The United States and South Korea have thus far not conceded to Pyongyang’s 
demands, and it is unlikely that greater North Korean nuclear capabilities will 
compel them to do so. Enhanced North Korean nuclear missile capabilities will 
not translate into a greater likelihood of compellence threats sustaining revisions 
to the status quo. If Pyongyang issues demands for bilateral negotiations with 
the United States after, say, testing a nuclear-capable missile that detonates off 
the coast of Hawaii, Washington can and will likely make no conciliatory moves. 
Washington would be much more likely to structure a response that signals not 
only that concessions are not forthcoming but that further provocative behavior 
would not be tolerated. U.S. forces in South Korea might be put on high alert, 
B-2 bombers might make flights over Pyongyang, and Kim would likely be 
told that any nuclear missile that hits the U.S. mainland would be met with a 
devastating attack on Pyongyang. Washington may threaten to destroy further 
nuclear missiles on their launchpads. The likely outcome of all of this is that Kim 
would cause a nuclear crisis more serious than previous ones—one in which he 
will experience fear of imminent nuclear war. He might worry that a U.S. attack 
is imminent even though the nuclear missile did not reach Hawaii, or might fear 
that Washington is no longer willing to put up with his brinksmanship and is 
willing to risk nuclear war to destroy his regime. 
Fear, Risk, and Control
Fear is central to much of international politics (Tang 2008). According to the 
standard theoretical set-up—in which there is no international authority with 
the capability to enforce bargains between states and thus reveal the true balance 
of power and resolve—states that desire survival at a minimum and increased 
power at a maximum, but are also unable to credibly commit to agreements, 
introduce a large role for fear (Thucydides 1954; Jervis 1978, 172; Blight 1990; 
Mearsheimer 2001, 42-3). Uncertainty regarding whether states will be content 
with security or desire more power, whether they will abide by an agreement—
say not to develop nuclear weapons or use force—leaves a large role for fear in 
world politics. The presence of nuclear weapons may increase the costs of conflict 
and levels of fear (Waltz 2003, 154). Leaders may fear that others will cheat on 
agreements not to develop nuclear weapons or not to provide them or related 
infrastructure to third parties. They could entertain a healthy fear that any crisis 
could escalate to nuclear war, or believe that nuclear war is imminent even if it is 
not (Johnson and Tierney 2011). While few would argue with the claim that fear 
is central to international politics, especially in the nuclear age, no scholarship has 
addressed whether variation in levels of fear causes variation in policies. Nor has 
anybody applied such a psychological framework to the consequences of nuclear 
proliferation. Recent experimental research however offers clear predictions for 
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the effect of fear on leaders’ acceptance of risk.
The human brain has evolved a dual process information processing system 
to deal with threats to survival (Damasio 1996; McDermott 2004). The brain 
constantly scans the environment for potential threats and if none are detected, 
the system responsible for more complex calculations drives behavior. But if a 
threat is detected, the brain automatically shuts down the higher order system 
and gives precedence to a more simple system that makes very quick fight-or-
flight decisions. Once the brain perceives that the threat has evaporated the 
higher order system is again given precedence; but stimuli that are perceived 
as similar to any earlier ones that caused fear will give precedence to the more 
simple system that may make decisions similar to those made when fear was 
earlier experienced (Rosen 2005, 27-70). 
Jennifer Lerner and Dacher Keltner (2000; 2001) have shown that fear has 
systematic effects on people’s orientation to risk that is conditional on beliefs 
about control (Lerner et al. 2003). If people believe that they have a moderate 
level of control over the source of their fear—greater than zero but less than 
full control—the experience of fear causes them to avoid risk. However, beliefs 
about either total or no control reduce the effect of fear on risk. The treatment 
to manipulate fear used in their experiments was images of snakes and the 
destruction of September 11 that are known to induce fear (Smith and Ellsworth 
1985). But the ethics requirements to conduct these experiments stipulate that 
this effect of fear should wear off within hours or probably minutes. The effect of 
the fear of imminent nuclear war should produce much greater impact on risk. 
Moreover, the experience of fear of imminent nuclear war when one believes that 
they have genuine control over whether nuclear escalation occurs—the condition 
when the effect on risk acceptance should be greatest—cannot be replicated in 
the laboratory. The effect of emotions on financial decision-making, where actors 
have similarly strong incentives to behave rationally, is also strong (Lee and 
Andrade 2011). Other research has shown that sufficiently strong experiences of 
fear can cause psychological conditions that last a lifetime (Tooby and Cosmides 
2010, 119). There are, therefore, strong reasons to expect the experience of fear 
of imminent nuclear war, conditional on beliefs about control, to have significant 
effects on a leader’s attitude toward risk. 
The experience of fear of imminent nuclear war need not cause risk aversion 
because nuclear war is always extremely undesirable. Moreover, it is not clear that 
fear of imminent nuclear war would cause leaders to revise their estimates of its 
probability. Rather, because nuclear compellence raises the risk of inadvertent 
nuclear escalation, the experience of fear of imminent nuclear war, conditional 
on beliefs about control, should cause them to refrain from practicing nuclear 
compellence. While little in international politics is risk free, refraining from 
nuclear compellence will tend to reduce the risk of nuclear war. 
Moreover, in authoritarian states where the pool of leaders is centralized 
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and small, potential successors to leaders who cause a nuclear crisis may also 
have experienced fear of imminent nuclear war. There are thus strong reasons 
to believe that the leaders’ experience of fear of imminent nuclear war will cause 
revisionist states to refrain from nuclear compellence and accept the status quo. 
If these leaders or their successors begin to make progress by addressing their 
objectives through confidence building measures, diplomacy and institutionalized 
cooperation, later generations may face incentives to refrain from the dangerous 
nuclear compellence that their predecessors practiced.
The authorization to use nuclear weapons in authoritarian states usually 
resides solely with one leader. They should therefore believe that they have control 
over whether a crisis occurs or whether it escalates to nuclear war. The Soviet 
troops operating the tactical and intermediate nuclear weapons in Cuba had to 
receive permission from Moscow to use nuclear weapons. While permission to 
use tactical nuclear weapons may have been delegated to commanders in the 
field during the 10-month South Asia crisis in 2001-2002, Pervez Musharraf 
likely believed that he had a substantial amount of control over whether nuclear 
war occurred. The experience of fear of imminent nuclear war should reduce the 
acceptance of risk under these conditions.
Khrushchev experienced fear of imminent nuclear war on October 24 or 25, 
1962. The Soviet leader admitted to his colleagues on October 25 that we “started 
out and then got afraid” (Fursenko and Naftali 2006, 484). A Soviet deputy 
foreign minister told his colleagues that Khrushchev “shit his pants” when he 
heard that the U.S. Strategic Air Command was moving to DEFCON-2 (Dobbs 
2008, 112). Khrushchev admitted weeks later that “I was frightened about what 
could happen to my country or your country or all the other countries that would 
be devastated by a nuclear war” (Cousins 1972, 46). The Cold War did not end 
after the Cuban Missile Crisis, but from 1963 it exhibited much less danger. 
Mao engaged in several skirmishes in the five years following China’s 
development of nuclear weapons, but after experiencing fear of imminent war 
Sino-Soviet skirmishes in the Zhenbao area permanently stopped. Although there 
is no direct evidence that Mao experienced fear of imminent nuclear war, clearly 
a war scare occurred in 1969 (Kuisong 2000; Lewis and Xitai 2008). There is 
less evidence available in the Pakistani case, but on May 30 and 31, 2002, Pervez 
Musharraf experienced fear of imminent nuclear war. He apparently “hardly 
slept” because he “feared nuclear war” (Cohen 2013). Violence in Kashmir did 
not disappear after this but it did substantially decline (Kapur 2007; 2008). Also, 
it is possible that Musharraf ’s experience of fear caused the decline in Pakistani 
revisionism in Kashmir. It is not clear that the 2008 Mumbai attacks were 
sponsored by the Pakistani government. The Lakshar-e-Taiba may have taken 
over operational control of what may have been designed to be a much smaller 
operation by the Pakistani Army (Tellis 2009; Burke 2010). 
North Korea is different in many ways from the Soviet Union, China and 
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Pakistan, but these cases suggest that when revisionist leaders challenge the status 
quo, it may cause a nuclear crisis while believing that they have some control 
over whether or not nuclear war occurs, they refrain from nuclear compellence, 
moderate their foreign policies and accept earlier untenable status quos. 
Khrushchev, Mao and Musharraf held immense power in autocratic regimes. If 
Kim Jong Un experiences fear of imminent nuclear war and believes that he has 
some control over whether it occurs, he will probably behave similarly.    
But leaders of nuclear powers may experience either fear of imminent 
nuclear escalation or conventional destruction and believe that they have no 
control over whether it occurs. If their conventional military power is significantly 
weaker than their adversary, fear of imminent regime change or of conventional 
war may have similar effects as that of fear of imminent nuclear war. Fidel Castro 
did not have control over the nuclear weapons in Cuba. Therefore, he would 
probably have believed that he had little control over whether nuclear war or 
regime change occurred; he would have believed that only Khrushchev and 
Kennedy had this authority. On October 27, 1962, Castro anticipated an “almost 
inevitable” U.S. invasion in the next “24-72 hours” (Cold War International 
History Project 2012, 327). He wrote to Khrushchev that if U.S. forces invaded 
Cuba, the Soviet Union should “eliminate such danger forever through an act 
of clear legitimate defense, however harsh and terrible the solution would be.” 
In 1992 Castro said that during the crisis, if the United States had invaded, “I 
would have been ready to use nuclear weapons… [B]efore having the country 
occupied—totally occupied—we were ready to die in defense of our country.” 
(Blight et al. 1993, 252, 481). It is not clear that if Castro expected a devastating 
conventional or nuclear war, but he believed that the destruction of his regime 
was imminent, that nuclear war was likely or imminent, and that there was little 
that he could do to prevent it. Castro’s high level of risk acceptance has often been 
attributed to ideology or personality, but it is explained by the simple fact that he 
experienced fear of imminent destruction and believed that he had no control 
over it.
This variation in response to fear of imminent nuclear war and/or destruction 
offers important predictions of North Korean behavior. If Kim Jong Un 
experiences fear of imminent nuclear or conventional war and believes that he 
has some control over whether it occurs, subsequent North Korean behavior will 
be less dangerous. Kim will likely issue fewer nuclear compellence threats and 
behave like other experienced nuclear powers. If he experiences such fear and 
believes that he has no control, he may use nuclear weapons in a final bid to save 
his regime or ensure that South Korea and the United States also sustain serious 
damage. 
It is worth noting that provoking a crisis to cause Kim to experience fear 
of imminent nuclear war would be a bad idea because he would correctly 
believe that he had no control over it. He could not know that the intent was 
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only to cause a crisis rather than a war or regime change, and would, given his 
conventionally weak military position, likely, and probably correctly, believe that 
he had little control. A large part of why North Korean nuclear brinkmanship 
is so dangerous is North Korea’s relative weakness. If Kim experiences fear of 
imminent nuclear war or conventional destruction he may be highly likely to 
believe that he has no control over whether it occurs. Kim may believe that 
Washington desires an end to his regime, and may have learned from the 2003 
Iraq war and 2011 Libya intervention that the United States is willing to invade 
North Korea if Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons could be neutralized. Like Castro, 
his weak conventional power would leave him with little control over any conflict 
with the much more powerful United States and South Korea. If Kim genuinely 
believed that Washington or Seoul had initiated a crisis or were about to engage 
in an imminent preventive or pre-emptive attack, he would (rightly) believe that 
he had little control over escalation and faced the possibility of the destruction of 
his regime. Ironically, if North Korea was a stronger military power, Kim might 
believe that he had more control over a potential military confrontation. The very 
weakness that has driven Pyongyang’s quest for the bomb also leaves Kim prone 
to the preferences that caused the most dangerous part of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. 
The desired effects of the experience of fear of imminent nuclear war seem 
most likely to be brought about by unprovoked North Korean challenges. I have 
argued that this is precisely the sort of behavior that the capability to target the 
United States with nuclear weapons would embolden Kim to pursue. He would 
likely believe that he has more control over whether nuclear war occurs in such 
a scenario than one in which Washington or Seoul made the first move. If he 
believed that his actions caused escalation, he would likely believe that his actions 
might also de-escalate the crisis, as they have in the crises that have followed 
North Korea’s three nuclear tests. The United States, South Korea and the 
international community need to ensure that when a more serious nuclear crisis 
on the Korean peninsula causes Kim Jong Un to experience fear of imminent 
nuclear war—and it is almost guaranteed if Kim develops the capability to target 
the United States with nuclear weapons—he believes that he has control over 
whether war occurs and that he does not come to believe that a U.S. strike is 
imminent. This trade-off raises complex policy challenges. 
Policy Challenges
One trade-off can be dismissed fairly quickly: If North Korea develops the 
capability to target the United States with nuclear missiles, Seoul and Washington 
will have to live with it. They should not develop plans to destroy Pyongyang’s 
nuclear arsenal because identifying the location of every weapon would be 
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very difficult. In a regime that we know so little about that it took almost nine 
hours for Seoul to learn of Kim Jong Il’s death, it is not realistic to assume that 
Washington, Seoul and their allies can identify the location of each nuclear 
weapon. A preventive strike on North Korea that did not destroy all North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons would likely cause Kim to believe that he had little control, and 
so retaliate on Seoul and/or U.S. bases in the region with his remaining nuclear 
weapons.
If Kim develops the capability to target the United States with nuclear 
weapons and engages in a series of more provocative crises, leaders in Seoul and 
Washington will have to decide whether they would prefer that he experience 
fear in the short term—with the associated risk that he may believe that he has no 
control—or aim to ensure that he never experiences fear of imminent nuclear war. 
The risks associated with his belief in no control suggest that the latter may seem 
more desirable. But once Kim can target the United States with nuclear missiles, 
the frequency and boldness of his nuclear compellence threats will increase. 
Unless Washington grants him the diplomatic and economic concessions that he 
seeks—which is unlikely and perhaps undesirable if he and other states learn that 
nuclear threats will eventually gain concessions—South Korea and the United 
States will have to find a way to respond to his challenges and defend themselves. 
But defending Seoul from North Korean aggression gets back to the problem of 
Kim’s fear of imminent destruction and his belief in lack of control.
Seoul and especially Washington need to credibly assure Kim that they 
have no intention of destroying his regime in peacetime or during a crisis. While 
President Obama has stated that all options are on the table with regards to Iran 
and North Korea, he would do well to unilaterally renounce any U.S. moves 
toward Tehran, Pyongyang or elsewhere aimed at regime change. Any targeted 
military strikes against Pyongyang would likely be perceived by Kim as signs of 
imminent regime change over which he has no control. Seoul and Washington 
need to calibrate a response to North Korean aggression that does not allow 
Pyongyang to revise the status quo, but which does not cause Kim to believe that 
he has lost control of a crisis. They need to coordinate policies that prevent North 
Korea from sustaining revisions to the status quo but ensure that Kim always 
believes that he can de-escalate the crisis. Destroying North Korean missiles on 
the launchpad or in North Korean airspace might convince Kim that another 
attack on North Korean soil is imminent. But stating that any nuclear missiles 
will be destroyed once they approach South Korean, Japanese or U.S. airspace 
might deter Kim from these flight paths and reassure him that his adversaries’ 
intentions are more defensive than offensive. If nuclear-armed missiles are to be 
destroyed on the launchpad, Washington and Seoul have to clearly communicate 
to Pyongyang that missiles without nuclear payloads will not be destroyed, and 
that further use of force will not be forthcoming. 
To credibly commit that Washington does not intend to strike Pyongyang, 
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the United States might draw down troops in South Korea to numbers with 
an operational capability to defend Seoul from North Korean challenges but 
insufficient to engage in longer term combat. This might signal to Pyongyang 
that Washington does not wish to engage in regime change in North Korea and 
only wishes to maintain the status quo. A reduced U.S. role in organizing and 
implementing responses to North Korean provocations might teach Pyongyang 
that Seoul and Washington do not have offensive ambitions. 
It is also possible that once North Korea can target the United States with 
nuclear missiles, Pyongyang will engage in more aggressive behavior than the 
Yeonpyeong and Cheonan incidents. If Seoul were to retaliate, careful signals must 
be sent to Pyongyang to the effect that Seoul is only defending South Korean 
vessels and maintaining the status quo and does not plan to push further into 
North Korean territory. Ideally, these maneuvers would be conducted with vessels 
that Pyongyang understands to be best suited to defensive objectives. Retaliation 
against North Korean forces should be conducted by those forces ill-suited to an 
invasion of North Korea. 
Some might bemoan the fact that these policies effectively accept North 
Korea as a nuclear power. This conclusion is right and wrong. It is right insofar 
as it rejects arguments that claim that striking Pyongyang now is the best of a 
bad set of options, as well as its assumption that there are no ways of convincing 
North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons. It finds company in other work 
that argues that North Korea is unlikely to give up nuclear weapons and that we 
should focus on preventing Pyongyang from exporting its nuclear know-how and 
preventing inadvertent escalation on the Korean peninsula (Acton 2013). This 
conclusion is wrong in that it overlooks the fact that powerful economic, political 
and technological forces will eventually undermine North Korea if military 
force does not. The forces that isolate North Korea threaten to undermine the 
Kim dynasty. Ensuring that Kim experiences fear of imminent nuclear war, if 
he develops the capability to target the United States with nuclear weapons, and 
believes that he has control over his country’s fate, will ensure that the road to 
peace and unification is not marked by nuclear war. Regime collapse short of 
the use of military force may require Washington and Seoul to credibly commit 
to Kim and his associates that he has control over his future. If he believes that 
he will die, he may authorize the use of nuclear weapons. The South Korean 
development of nuclear weapons might influence the probability of a nuclear 
crisis on the Korean peninsula but will not alter the fundamental psychological 
logic outlined above. China’s aid to North Korea and its debatable influence over 
Pyongyang’s nuclear program would also not mitigate the psychological logic. 
The United States has maintained military operational control over South 
Korean forces since the Korean war. While Seoul assumed peacetime control in 
1994, the United States is still obliged to lead South Korea’s military in the event 
of war. South Korea was due to take over this role in 2012, but North Korean 
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provocations caused this date to be pushed back to December 2015. South 
Korean defense minister Kim Kwan-Jin recently stated to a parliamentary defence 
committee of the South Korean National Assembly that “considering the third 
nuclear test and the situations from March to May, the December 2015 deadline 
is not appropriate” (Kim 2013). In the weeks after North Korea’s third nuclear test, 
U.S. Air Force B-52 and B-2 stealth bombers flew on roundtrips over the Korean 
peninsula where the latter dropped inert munitions on a South Korean bombing 
range (Dudley 2013). Pentagon officials called this mission a clear demonstration 
of “the United States’ ability to conduct long range, precision strikes quickly 
and at will.” South Korean President Park Geun-Hye claimed, in October 2013, 
that she would seek highly accurate anti-WMD capabilities from the United 
States and/or interoperability with U.S. systems that enable pre-emptive strikes 
on North Korean missile and nuclear sites (Yonhap News October 1, 2013; 
Lee 2013). It is hard to imagine how the United States can credibly commit to 
leave Kim with the belief that he has some control over the fate of his regime 
amidst a nuclear crisis without handing over operational control of U.S. forces 
in South Korea to Seoul and substantially reducing the U.S. military forces on 
the Korean peninsula. All of this will likely require humility in Washington and 
an acceptance of the limitations of U.S. power. Similarly, Seoul will need to take 
a more independent role in engaging North Korea. While nuclear proliferation 
on the Korean peninsula has become dangerous because Kim has learned that 
nuclear compellence works, it will become safer if Kim experiences fear of 
imminent nuclear war in a crisis and believes that he has control over nuclear 
escalation. 
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